The Capital Structure Problem
Remember our definition of :
The value of a firm is the price for which one could sell the stream of cash flows that the assets of the firm generates for the traditional creditors.
Because of value additivity and no free lunches, equals the market value of the liabilities to the traditional creditors (see Chapter 2). Usually, we distinguish only equity, with a value , and debt, with a value . Hence, Note we have not defined to be equal to plus . We wanted to give a separate life, because this allowed us to determine separately, and to derive and from using derivatives analysis.
Until now, we have taken the value of the firm to be exogenous. We derived the value of equity and debt from that of the firm. The capital structure problem concerns whether there could be a feedback effect, or, could changing the capital structure (debt/equity mix) change the value of the firm? This is the capital structure problem:
Does the way a firm is financed (its debt/equity mix) affect the firm value?
If it does, what is the optimal debt/equity mix, the one that maximizes the value of the firm?
In this and the next chapter we will figure out whether we are really justified in ignoring any feedback effects. As it turns out, under fairly general conditions there is no feedback, firm value is independent of the capital structure. Showing this result and under what conditions it holds is the topic of this chapter. In the next chapter we will look at conditions that make that intuition break down. In particular we look at how taxes affect things.
The Capital Structure Problem when Assets are In Place:
Modigliani Miller I
We will provide a clear answer to the capital structure problem under the assumption that the company's assets are already "in place". By that we mean that investment took place and is irreversible. It can then be shown that the value of the firm does not depend on the debt/equity mix. Showing this is one of the most famous results in finance, the Modigliani Miller Theorem I (MM I). The main result can be stated as If we assume that the change in financing mix does not affect the total cash flows of the firm accruing to the shareholders and bondholders, changing the debt/equity ratio does not change , the value of the firm.
Intuitively, it can't possibly affect , because "same cash flows implies same value." Otherwise there would be an arbitrage opportunity (free lunch). In their original proof of the above proposition, Modigliani and Miller exploited the arbitrage opportunity in an ingenious way. We will go through their argument. Assume there are two firms, a levered one (one with both debt and equity), with value , and an unlevered one (one with only equity), with value . Debt is perpetual, paying a coupon per period. Take the case where . An arbitrageur could buy, say, 15% of the equity of the unlevered firm. This will generate a cash flow of per period. To finance this purchase, the arbitrageur sells short 15% of the equity of the levered firm, that is, he promises to deliver in perpetuity. That leaves him with per period. The arbitrageur borrows in perpetuity as much as he can cover with an interest payment of . The bank will lend him: So, our arbitrageur has no net cash in/outflow in the future. At present, however, he has a cash inflow equal to:
Our arbitrageur can go out and have a free lunch. We leave it to the reader to argue for the existence of an arbitrage opportunity if . We will look at an example where a firm decides on how large a bank loan to take out to finance a project. Unlike in the MM I proof, the (bank) debt in the example is risky. That does not affect the MM I proposition, of course. We will investigate how the bank changes the interest rate it charges on the loan as the size of the loan increases.
Example Mobell wants to build a jet fuel tank at the Jackson Hole (Wyoming) airport. The tank is to be owned and operated by a wholly-owned subsidiary, JackMo. Building the tank costs 5. The tank holds 1,000 liter, and the current price of one liter is 0.40. Let us consider two periods only. Today, the tank is built and filled. Next period JackMo sells the entire content of the tank. Handling and delivery costs are 0.10 per liter. The price at which JackMo will be able to sell the jet fuel is either 0.80 per liter or 0.50 per liter. The riskfree interest rate is 10%. Today, the futures quote for a contract to deliver one liter of jet fuel tomorrow is 0.55.
Mobell decides to finance JackMo partly through a bank loan. It approaches First Yellow Bank. It asks for a interest rate quote for loans with face values of 200 and 400 dollars. The remainder will be financed through an equity issue to Mobell.
What is the rate that First Yellow Bank should charge on those loans? Does the value of JackMo remain the same, whether the 200 loan or the 400 loan is chosen? How does the average rate of return on equity change with increased leverage?
Let us first find the cash flows for JackMo. The investment is . The period 1 cash flow depend on the oil price at time 1. If we let be this oil price, the cash flow is . The possible cash flows for JackMo is thus
To price JackMo we need state-price probabilities for the two possible "oil price states." These can actually be found from the futures price. We will return to pricing of futures in chapter 21, but for now the important thing about them is that futures prices are set so that the NPV of investing in a futures is zero. This can be used to find the state price probability Solving for we find
The current value of JackMo is then calculated as
Let us see how this value is distributed on debt and equity, first in the case of the bank loan of 200. Let be the face value of the debt. For the bank, lending money to JackMo should be a zero-NPV proposition. JackMo always have enough cash flow to pay Alternatively one can argue: The loan of 200 is risk free, the bank will charge the risk free rate of 10% on it.
The sum of debt and equity is , the same as the all-equity financed firm above.
In the case of the 400 loan, let be the sum of face value and interest.
Note that JackMo will default in the down state. The bank is charging an interest rate of . The value of equity in this case is
The sum of debt and equity is . The value of the firm is the same, no matter what the debt/equity mix is. This is MM I. The value of the firm is independent of the loan amount, because the loan does not affect the cash flows in either state.
Is Maximizing the Value of the Firm Optimal for Shareholders?
Why did we cast the problem of this chapter in terms of maximizing the value of the firm as opposed to the value of shareholding? After all, management is accountable to shareholders (only)! In fact, we should ask: when is maximizing the value of the firm identical to maximizing the value of equity? Since we analyzed valuation using option pricing theory, the answer is actually very simple. Equity should be considered a call option on the assets of the firm. In particular, if is the future value of the firm, and denotes the face value of debt plus interest payments, equity pays:
. From option pricing theory, we know that the value of a call option increases with the value of the underlying asset, which in the case of equity is . Thus, increasing increases , maximizing the value of the firm is consistent with maximizing the value of equity.
But some care should be used in interpreting this result. The value of a call option increases with the value of the underlying asset when everything else is kept constant. Other features of the option, like the volatility of the underlying, the interest rates, and the exercise price ( in the case of equity) must be kept constant.
Implications for Cost of Equity Capital: MM II
Since remains fixed, no matter what the equity/debt financing mix is, we can derive the second Modigliani-Miller proposition. It expresses the (required) rate of return on equity as a function of that on the assets of the firm and the firm's debt. Of course, the expressions are valid only for the special world that Modigliani and Miller live in (riskfree cash flows, perpetual payments, etc.).
Let , and denote the rates of return on the assets of the firm, equity and debt, respectively. Then:
In fact, this is just the implication of value additivity that we have been using throughout. It can be derived from looking at the value of equity as the difference of the value of the firm and its debt.
(17.1) is then obtained using , and . Analogously, the required rate of return on equity is determined by that on the assets of the firm and that of the firm's debt.
Example
Let us continue the JackMo example, and now assume that the probability of the "up" state is 20%. We can compute the expected return on equity for the two loans: Figure 17 .1 illustrates MM II (for a risky world). The required rate of return on equity increases with the amount of debt in the capital structure.
Let us also calculate the returns on the unlevered firm and the debt Figure 17 .1 MM II for JackMo
✻ ✲
The expected return on debt also increases to reflect its risk. Just an aside: Would First Yellow Bank be willing to provide any size bank loan? You'll observe that there are loan amounts (less than $405) such that First Yellow Bank cannot charge an interest high enough that it's worth for them to provide a loan. Hence, JackMo is credit-constrained. The credit constraint is a very natural consequence of the design of bank loans. Notice also that, as the state-price probability of the "default" state increases (perhaps because the actual chances of JackMo defaulting increases), First Yellow Bank will lower the amount it can possibly lend. Hence, JackMo will be further constrained.
A remark here, though. There is something deeply unsatisfactory about (17.1). Because everything is riskfree is Modigliani and Miller's world, , where is the risk free interest rate. Hence, , and does not change with leverage, unlike what (17.1) seems to indicate! To really get an idea about how the required rate of return on equity goes up with leverage, one must introduce risk. Since we know how to price equity and debt in a risky world, we are able to come up with clean answers. In particular, the JackMo example illustrates that both Modigliani and Miller's theory continues to hold in a risky world, the required rate of return goes up with leverage. A picture like figure 17.2 is closer to the true situation.
This should also convince the skeptics among you, who may still not be sure what all this derivatives analysis is good for. The previous remark applies, mutatis mutandis, to all other Modigliani-Miller cases which we will discuss. 
What if Assets are Not In Place?
The assumption that "Assets are in place" is very important.
Example
Recall the example from section 16.4, where we saw that we were able to make the shareholders better off by switching to a riskier project after the financing was in. In that example, the value of the firm did not change upon the switch, but the value of equity (per share or in toto) definitely increased! We know why switching to a riskier project is advantageous to shareholders. Equity is a call option in the company, and the value of a call increases with the volatility of the underlying asset, keeping everything else constant. Note that we kept the value constant across projects in that example.
If we allow the "assets in place" to change, and the firm management maximizes the value of the shareholders equity, it may even happen that an increase in the debt ratio will make the management take on very risky negative NPV projects in order to increase the value of equity. Stiglitz (1988) and Myers (2001) . Textbook discussions are found in Grinblatt and Titman (2001), Brealey et al. (2010) is an all-equity firm famous for its antique furniture business. If the firm uses 36% leverage through issuance of long-term debt, the CFO predicts that there is a 20% chance that the ROE(Return on Equity) will be 10%, 40% chance that the ROE will be 15%, and 40% chance that the ROE will be 20%. The firm is tax-exempt. Explain whether the firm should change its capital structure if the forecast of the CFO changes to 30%, 50% and 20% chances respective for the three ROE possibilities.
V&M [5]
Note: In the question you are asked to assume risk neutrality. This means that the state price probabilities are not colored by risk aversion (fear) so they are equal to the estimated probabilities in the question. VanSant Corporation and Matta, Inc., are identical firms except that Matta, Inc., is more levered than VanSant. The companies' economists agree that the probability of a recession next year is 20% and the probability of a continuation of the current expansion is 80%. If the expansion continuous, each firm will have EBIT of 2 million. If a recession occurs, each firm will have EBIT of 0.8 million. VanSant's debt obligation required the firm to make 750,000 in payments. Because Matta carries more debt, its debt payment obligations are 1 million. Assume that the investors in these firms are risk-neutral and that they discount the firms' cash flows at 15%. Assume a one-period example. Also assume there are no taxes.
1. Duane, the president of VanSant, commented to Matta's president, Deb, that his firm has a higher value than Matta, Inc, because VanSant has less debt and, therefore, less bankruptcy risk. Is Duane correct?
2. Using the data of the two firms, prove your answer.
3. What might cause the firms to be valued differently?
17.7 Negative NPV? [3] Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Explain your answer.
A firm's stockholders would never want the firm to invest in projects with negative NPV.
